Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. Bryan Jay Stephens : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert K. Heineman; Robin K. Ljungberg; Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Barnard N. Madsen; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham Attorney General; Michael
Christensen; Deputy District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Stephens, No. 960452 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/350

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960452-CA
Priority No. 2

BRYAN JAY STEPHENS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal

from a judgment and conviction for unlawful

possession of methamphetamine (Utah Code Ann. § .58-37-8(2) (a) (i) ,
3rd degree felony), marijuana (Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) ,
class B misdemeanor), and drug paraphernalia (Utah Code Ann. § 5837a-5>, class B misdemeanor), in the Third Judicial District Court,
Division I, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG (6056)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960452-CA
Priority No. 2

BRYAN JAY STEPHENS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine (Utah Code Ann. § .58-37-8(2) (a) (i) ,
3rd degree felony), marijuana (Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i),
class B misdemeanor) , and drug paraphernalia (Utah Code Ann. § 5837a-&, class B misdemeanor), in the Third Judicial District Court,
Division I, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG (6056)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION BELOW
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
POINT II.
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
COMMENTING ON THE DRUG PROBLEM IN SOCIETY AT
LARGE.
Addendum A -- Pages 2 and 3 of Deputy Broadhead' report (R. 3 9
Addendum B -- Trial court findings and conclusions (R. 41-6)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
page
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507,
19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)

5

People v. Sanders. 385 N.E.2d 375 (111. 1976)
People v. Thiret. 685 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1984)

7
......

7,

8

State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986) .

8

State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992)

6

State v. Cuzick. 585 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1978)

7

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

6,

8

State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992)

9

State v. Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1994)

6

State v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995)

8

State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992)

2

State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990) .

7

State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App.), cert.
denied. 868 P.2d 1995 (Utah 1993)

9

State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985)

9

State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1991)

2

State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

2

People v. Torrand. 622 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1981)

7

United States v. Dichiarinte. 445 F.2d 126 (7th
Cir. 1971)
Walter v. United States. 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct.
2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980)

ii

7
6

page
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. IV

1, 5-8

Utah Const, art. I, § 14

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996)

iii

1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v
Case No. 960452-CA
Priority No. 2

BRYAN JAY STEPHENS,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code A -

-,-ou/\e) (1996).

STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
T--.-

^ourt.h

amendment

to

the

federal

constitution

provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. ••.

Article "1 section

14 of the Utah Constitution provides:1

Sec. 14.
Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
x

Mr. Stephens advances no separate state constitutional claim,
but article I, § 14 nevertheless grants him protection at least
equal to that of the fourth amendment.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's

motion to suppress?
Standard of review .
In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991);
Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a) (1990) . However, in reviewing the court's
conclusions of law, we apply a correction of error
standard. Steward, 806 P.2d at 215.
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992) .
Preserved

below

at

R.

25-31

(motion

and

memo

to

suppress), 162-96 (suppression hearing transcript), especially at
193-4.
2.

Whether

the

prosecutor

committed

misconduct

in

commenting on the drug problem in society at large?
Standard
questions

and

determination

of

Review.

argument,
of

In

this

whether

assessing

court

the

will

the
make

prosecutor

prosecutor's
an

original

brought

improper

information to the jury's attention, and whether such information
probably influenced the jurors.
(Utah 1984) .

State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486

If this court views the evidence of guilt to be

ambiguous or in conflict with other evidence, this court will "more
closely scrutinize the conduct."

Id.

Preserved below at R. 352.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Bryan

Jay

Stephens

was

charged

by

information

with

possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.
2

R. 5-6. He filed a motion to suppress, R. 25-31 (motion and memo),
33-40 (State's response), which was heard, R. 162-196, and denied,
R. 41-6 (findings and conclusions) . Mr. Stephens was convicted at
jury trial, and sentenced to the Utah State Prison, stayed pending
satisfactory completion of probation.
(judgement, sentence (commitment)).

R. 93-5 (verdicts), 136-9

This appeal ensued.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 20, 1994, Deputy Broadhead
Stephen's vehicle for failure to signal.

stopped Mr.

His report reads:

As I activated my overhead lights the driver and sole occupant
of the vehicle made several rapid movements towards his right.
The car did not initially stop, but continued eastbound on
4500 South. Eventually the vehicle stopped and as I exited my
patrol car and was approaching the suspect vehicle on foot I
again saw the suspect made another rapid stuffing movement
towards the right front passenger seat area.
As I approached the vehicle I made contact with a male White
driver who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, later
identified as suspect Bryan Stephens. I asked the suspect why
he was making all of the stuffing movements towards the right
front area of the car prior to my stopping him. The suspect
responded, "I didn't know that I was."
I then asked the suspect if he had concealed any weapons or
any kind of contraband under the seat. The suspect replied,
"No, you're free to look if you want." During my conversation
with the suspect I noticed that he had a large amount of sweat
on his forehead and on his face, and that he appeared
extremely nervous.
I explained to the suspect that because of his stuffing
movements, as well as his nervous demeanor, that I feared that
he had placed some sort of weapon or contraband underneath the
front seat and that I would like to check under that area.
Again the suspect said, "Go right ahead."
I then had the suspect exit the vehicle at which time I looked
under the right front seat. At that time I was able to see a
brown leather case which was partially protruding from
3

underneath the right front seat.
under that area of the seat.

There were no other items

Because that was the only item under the seat, coupled with
the fact I had seen the suspect make the stuffing motions to
that area, I opened the purse (?) and saw that it contained
[drugs and drug paraphernalia] .
Deputy Broadhead's report at 2-3, R. 39-40.2
Mr. Stephens moved to suppress the evidence on various
grounds including, inter

alia,

that the officer exceeded the scope

of any consent by opening the leather purse in which the drugs and
paraphernalia were found.

R. 175, 193-4, renewed at trial at R.

294-5.3
Mr.

Stephens

was

convicted

at

trial.

During

the

prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor drew the jurors'
attention to the drug problem at large:
[By the prosecutor] You may say, "Well, yeah we have got
Mr. Stephens charged with a crime. There is no victim
here with regard to those offenses. We have only taken
roughly two hours to present the case to you today, why
all of the big fuss and bother to occupy your time for a
day? Well, you all know the impact that this type of
offense has.
MR. YOUNGBERG: Objection, judge.
THE COURT: Sustained and Mr. Christensen I am going
to ask that you refrain from making that argument and,
members of the jury, let me just simply admonish you that
your verdict in this case, of course, must be based
solely and totally upon the evidence that is introduced
during this particular case and, of course, you must not
be swayed by public opinion or feeling.
R. 352.
2

These pages are attachments to the State's memorandum in
opposition and were relied on by both parties as the factual basis
for the suppression motion. A copy is attached as addendum A.
3

The leather purse or pouch was admitted at trial as State's
Exhibit 1. R. 224 (brown pouch identified by Deputy Broadhead), R.
2 93 (received into evidence).
4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The consent Deputy Broadhead

obtained

to

"look" or

"check" under the seat of Mr. Stephens7 vehicle cannot reasonably
be construed to extend to closed containers.
actions

exceeded

the

scope

of

the

Deputy Broadhead's

consent.

Mr. Stephens'

suppression motion should have been granted.
The

prosecutor

committed

prejudicial

misconduct

commenting on the drug problem in society at large.
court's admonition could not dispel the prejudice.

by

The trial

The State had

scant evidence linking Mr. Stephens to the leather purse containing
the contraband.

It is entirely possible that the jury convicted

Mr. Stephens based on concerns about the drug problem, especially
among homeless persons, rather than a knowing or intentional
possession of contraband.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

IN

DENYING

To be proper under the fourth amendment, the State has
the burden of showing that an exception to the warrant requirement
is applicable to a warrantless search. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
The State argued only consent, and the trial court
sustained the search here based on Mr. Stephens' consent.
Findings, R. 41-6, attached as Addendum B.

However, the trial

court failed to address the scope of that consent.

5

See

"Even when a constitutionally valid consent is given, the
scope of the ensuing search must be limited to the scope of the
consent, and police activity that exceeds the scope of the consent
violates the Fourth Amendment. " State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1218
(Utah 1993) ; accord Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100
S.Ct.

2395,

measuring

2401, 65 L.Ed.2d

the

scope

of

a

410

(1980).

suspect's

consent

"The

standard

under

the

for

Fourth

Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness--what would the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between
the officer and the suspect?"

State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705

(Utah App. 1992) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111
S.Ct.

1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d

297

(1991)); accord State v.

Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 552 n.6 (Utah App. 1994).
The consent given here cannot be reasonably construed to
extend to sealed containers.

Deputy Broadhead's report provides:

I then asked the suspect if he had concealed any weapons or
any kind of contraband under the seat. The suspect replied,
"No, you're free to look if you want." During my conversation
with the suspect I noticed that he had a large amount of sweat
on his forehead and on his face, and that he appeared
extremely nervous.
I explained to the suspect that because of his stuffing
movements, as well as his nervous demeanor, that I feared that
he had placed some sort of weapon or contraband underneath the
front seat and that I would like to check under that area.
Again the suspect said, "Go right ahead."
Mr. Stephens only offered to allow Deputy Broadhead to "look" under
the passenger seat.

Deputy Broadhead only requested to "check"

under the right front seat. Mr. Stephens consented to this limited
intrusion.

That search revealed the zippered leather purse or

6

pouch,

A zippered leather purse or pouch is neither a weapon nor

contraband.
Deputy Broadhead exceeded the scope of Mr. Stephens'
consent by opening the zippered leather purse or pouch.
Broadhead never used the word "search" in his request.

Deputy

See also R.

220-221 (at trial, Deputy Broadhead testifies again using only the
words "check" and "look").

Deputy Broadhead looked under the seat,

and saw only the zipped leather purse or pouch.

The leather purse

or pouch was neither a weapon nor contraband.
further,

without

probable

cause

or

consent,

By proceeding

Deputy

Broadhead

violated Mr. Stephens' fourth amendment and article I, section 14
rights.
People
instructive.

v.

Thiret,

685

P.2d

193

(Colo.

1984) 4

is

There, officers asked defendant "if he minded if they

'looked around the house,'" and he consented to this intrusion.
685 P. 2d at 197.

The court

found that

the

search performed

exceeded the scope of the consent given:
What the defendant agreed to was to permit the officers
to "look around" the house. A "look around" connotes a
casual observation of the premises. The "look around,"
however, consisted of a search of the defendant's three
bedroom house by four officers over a period of fortyfive minutes, including an inspection of piles of clothes
and debris, and an examination of drawers, boxes, and
other closed containers. This extensive type of search
was far in excess of the "look around" authorized by the
defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Dichiarinte. 445
F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971); [People v. iTorrand. 622 P.2d
562 [Colo. 1981]; People v. Sanders. 44 111. App.3d 510,
3 111.Dec. 208, 385 N.E.2d 375 (1976); State v. Cuzick,
21 Wash.App. 501, 585 P.2d 485 (1978), and the seizure of
4

Thiret was cited with approval by this Court in State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1990).
7

the photograph and the film in the course of the search
was invalid.
Thiret, 685 P.2d at 201.
In State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah App. 1995),
this Court invalidated (but held harmless) the removal of part of
a wall and a piece of carpet under a generalized consent to search
a house.

Here, Deputy Broadhead's search of the closed leather

container under Mr. Stephens' seat exceeded the scope of the
consent to "look" or "check" under the seat.
Under all the facts and circumstances, the search here
was improper under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14.
The motion to suppress should have been granted.

POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
COMMENTING ON THE DRUG PROBLEM IN SOCIETY AT
LARGE.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the
drug problem in society at large, indicating that this case was
important because of that societal problem and implying that the
jury should convict in part to help remedy that problem.

This

argument was improper on two grounds.
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1991) the
court found it improper for the prosecutor to argue that jurors
should

consider

their

obligations

to

society

in

their

deliberations. The statement here, "Well, you all know the impact
that this type of offense has," invites the jurors to do precisely
the same. Accord State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986)
("Statements which suggest that a jury has an obligation to convict
8

a defendant on some basis other than solely on the evidence before
it are improper and beyond the broad latitude allowed in closing
argument."); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112

(Utah 1985)

(condemning statements which "suggested that the jury had some
obligation beyond the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the defendant solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at
trial").
The statement here also runs afoul of the prohibition
against unsupported innuendo.

In State v. Emmett, 839 P. 2d 781

(Utah 1992) the court held that it was improper to ask questions
which implied facts which were not proven.

"Otherwise, the only

limit on such a line of questioning would be the prosecutor's
imagination. "

Emmett, 839 P. 2d at 787.

Accord State v. Palmer,

860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 868 P.2d 1995 (Utah
1993) . Here, no evidence was presented concerning the drug problem
in society at large, nor would any such evidence have been relevant
or admissible.

The elements of the offenses charged do not

implicate or require proof of any societal drug problems.

By

commenting on such matters, the prosecutor was in effect becoming
a fact witness in the trial, a role he has no business playing.
Accord State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343

(Utah App.), cert,

denied, 868 P.2d 1995 (Utah 1993).
Drawing the jurors' attention to societal drug problems
creates a serious risk that the jurors may convict because of their
concern about those societal problems, rather than basing their
verdict solely on consideration of whether the prosecution has
9

established the elements of the charged offenses. In a close case,
such as this, such misconduct can shift the tide and result in a
conviction where an acquittal might otherwise have been rendered.
The prosecution had scant evidence linking Mr. Stephens
to the leather purse or pouch which contained the drugs and
paraphernalia.

Deputy Broadhead testified concerning the alleged

stuffing motions he observed.

R. 214, 216-7.

Mr. Stephens

testified that it was not his. R. 321. Officer Broadhead7 s report
originally stated, "He stated that the case was not his and that he
did not know how it got into his car," Report at 3 (R. 40), R. at
263-4, but Broadhead later filed a supplemental report claiming
that Mr. Stephens had said the case was his, but he did not know
how the contents came to be inside.

R. 264-5.

Defense witness

Elena Garcia testified that she was with Mr. Stephens the date of
the alleged offense, and that he had transported a possibly
homeless women "Debbie" and all of her belongings to an apartment
building on Redwood Road. R. 297-301, 307. She testified that the
leather purse or pouch "looks like something she had."

R. 301-2.

Debbie sat in the back seat behind the passenger seat while being
transported.

R. 302.

Ms. Garcia had never seen Mr. Stephens in

possession of the purse.

R. 303.

Mr. Stephens also testified

concerning transporting Debbie. R. 317-8. Mr. Stephens testified
that the movements Deputy Broadhead observed may have been Stephens
attempting to buckle his seatbelt.

R. 321.

This case turned on whether the jury believed Deputy
Broadhead and his supplemental report over Mr. Stephens, Ms.
10

Garcia,

and

reference

Broadhead's

original

to the drug problem

report.

The

prosecution's

in society, in light of this

evidentiary picture, was highly prejudicial. There was substantial
evidence that the purse and its contents may have belonged to
Debbie, a possibly homeless person.

It is entirely possible that

the jury convicted Mr. Stephens based on concerns about the drug
problem, especially among homeless persons.
While the trial court sustained the objection and gave a
cautionary instruction, the harm had already been done.
once rung cannot be unrung.

The bell

Mr. Stephens should be granted a new

trial.

CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing,

Mr.

Stephens

respectfully

requests that his conviction be vacated, his suppression motion be
granted, and that the case be remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

?/

day of March, 1997.

ROBERT K: HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to Kris Leonard, the Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this %l
March, 1997.

Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of March, 1997.
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ADDENDUM A
Pages 2 and 3 of Deputy Broadhead's Report (R. 39-40)

'OFFiNtccooE:

SALT U X E COUNTY SHERIFFS OPPlwE
NARRATIVE CONTINUATION SHEET

^

wui^p'"

94-22083

booked into Evidence at 0100 hours.
PREMISES:
A public street.
NARRATIVE SECTION:
At the indicated time this date while on routine patrol I was driving
my marked patrol car southbound on 300 West and approximately 40th
South. I was following a silver colored Ford Fairmont which was
in front of me, also southbound 300 West approaching 4500 South.
Upon arriving at the light at 4500 South and 3rd West the suspect
vehicle as well as myself stopped for the red light. As the traffic
signal turned green for southbound traffic the suspect vehicle made
a left hand turn onto 4500 South, proceeding eastbound. The suspect
vehicle made this turn without signaling.
I then effected a traffic stop of the vehicle at 80 East and 4500
South in order to contact the driver regarding the traffic violation.
As I activated my overhead lights the driver and sole occupant of
the vehicle made several rapid movements towards his right.
The car did not initially stop, but continued eastbound on 4500 South.
Eventually the vehicle stopped and as I exited my patrol car and was
approaching the suspect vehicle on foot I again saw the suspect made
another rapid stuffing movement towards the right front passenger seat
area.
As I approached the vehicle I made contact with a male White driver
who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, later identified as suspect
Bryan Stephens. I asked the suspect why he was making all of the
stuffing movements towards the right front area of the car prior to
my stopping him. The suspect responded, "I didn't know that I was."
I then asked the suspect if he had concealed any weapons or any kind
of contraband under the seat. The suspect replied, wNo, you're free
to look if you want." During my conversation with the suspect I
noticed that he had a large amount of sweat on his forehead and on
his face, and that he appeared extremely nervous.
I explained to the suspect that because of his stuffing movements,
as well as his nervous demeanor, that I feared that he had placed
some sort of weapon or contraband underneath the front seat and
that I would like to check under that area. Again the suspect said,

tWUtft* R°l

Deputy Nona:

BROADHEAD

6H

mt E WfcL/?*

L

$0007-01*0

0 0003 §

' OFFENSE COOK

CASENUMMA:

SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE
^ 3 IKUViAL R5P6RT

NARRATIVE CONTINUATION SHEET

•

94*22083

FOLLOW-UP

"Go r i g h t ahead."
I then had the suspect exit the vehicle at which time I
the right front seat. At that time I was able to see a
case which was partially protruding from underneath the
seat. There were no other items under that area of the

looked under
brown leather
right front
seat.

Because that was the only item under the seat, coupled with the fact
that I had seen the suspect make the stuffing motions to that area,
I opened the purse (?) and saw that it contained the following items:
two Ziploc baggies containing suspected marijuana, one glass vial
containing suspected marijuana, a large paper bindle containing
suspected methamphetamine, a mirror with white powder residue, a
marijuana smoking pipe, three snorting straws, several unused paper
bindles.
I then approached the suspect with the brown leather case and its
contents and asked him what he knew about the contents of the case.
He stated that the case was not his and that he did not know how
it got into his car. I then advised the suspect of his Miranda
rights to which he stated that he understood and that he was
desirous of contacting an attorney prior to speaking with me about
the case; therefore, I did not ask the suspect any other questions
concerning this matter.
Because the suspect admitted that the case was used by him as well as
him being the sole occupant of the car, coupled with the stuffing
movements that I saw him make to the right front seat area as well as
there being no other items under the seat, I formed the opinion that
the suspect knew about those items and had concealed them at that
location.
I arrested him for possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana and possession of narcotic paraphernalia. I subsequently
transported and booked him into Salt Lake County Jail for those
charges.
Deputy Snyder, who was with me during this entire incident and who
witnessed the consent from the suspect to check his vehicle, also
impounded the suspect's car as hold for owner.
The facts of this case will be presented to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office for consideration of a criminal filing. There is
nothing further at this time. This report concluded.
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ADDENDUM B
Trial court findings and conclusions (R. 41-6)

Third judicial District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI^j^CjTg jggg
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP W U J I T U , i & i ; t t 1 Y
,ju*y Clerk

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
VS.

J
:

CASE NO.

951901961F8

!

BRYAN JAY STEPHENS

J

Defendant

:

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

The above-entitled matter came before this court pursuant to
Defendant's MOTION TO SUPPRESS on the 2nd day of January 1996
challenging the search and subsequent seizure of controlled
substances and drug paraphernalia. The defendant although not
present was represented by his attorney of record, Robin K.
Youngberg, the State was represented by attorney of record,
Michael J. christensen.
The Court having heard the arguments of both the defendant
and the State regarding the defendant's Motion to Suppress, now
being fully advised makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 20, 1995, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Dave

Broadhead witnessed the defendant Bryan Jay Stephens violate the
traffic code by failing to properly signal while turning left
(eastbound) at 300 West and 4500 South.
2.

Deputy Broadhead activated his overhead lights to effect a
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traffic stop.

The defendant did not immediately stop and made

several rapid movements to the right prior to stopping.

As

Deputy Broadhead exited his vehicle and approached, the defendant
made another rapid "stuffing" movement to the right.
3.

The defendant denied making any stuffing movements when asked

about his actions prior and after stopping by Deputy Broadhead.
In response to Deputy Broadhead's query if he had any concealed
weapons or contraband under the seat, the defendant said; "No,
you're free to look if you want."
4.

Because of the defendant's apparent extreme nervousness,

Deputy Broadhead explained to the defendant his concern for his
safety as well as the possibility that the defendant had placed a
weapon or contraband under the front seat.

Deputy Broadhead

requested permission to check under the seat and the defendant
responded "Go right ahead."
5.

The defendant exited the vehicle and Deputy Broadhead looked

under the right front seat where he observed the suspicious
movement.

Deputed Broadhead limited his search to the right

front area and found a brown leather case under the right front
seat.

On opening the leather case, Deputy Broadhead found

various controlled substances as well as drug paraphernalia.
6.

The defendant denied knowledge or ownership of the leather

case at which time Deputy Broadhead then Mirandized the defendant
and arrested him for possession of controlled substances and drug
paraphernalia.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The reasonableness of the search and seizure incident to the

traffic stop is governed by a two prong test: (1) Was Deputy
Broadhead's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was the
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the interference in the first place?
Terry v- Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968).

2.

Deputy Broadhead was constitutionally justified in stopping

the defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation committed in his
presence.

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). (Also

stipulated by both sides).
3.

Deputy Broadhead's investigative questioning of the defendant

did not exceed the limited scope of the initial traffic stop but
served to confirm or dispel his concern about the aef^T^aTrt/s
actions during the course of the traffic stop.

During the brief

investigative questioning, it was necessary to detain the
defendant.

State v, Grovier, 808 P.2d 133,136 (Utah Ct. App.

1991) (quoting United States v. Shame. 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105,
S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)).
4.

Despite the purposes of a traffic stop, Deputy Broadhead's

inquiries though unrelated to the traffic violation were
objectively supported by probable cause as well as reasonable
suspicion.

Lopez at 1135.

Specifically, (1) the defendant

failed to immediately pull over when signaled, (2) the defendant
made several rapid movements to the right before stopping, and
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after stopping as the officer approached his vehicle, (3) the
defendant's denial of any "stuffing" movements and apparent
extreme nervousness, and (4) Deputy Broadhead's concern for his
safety as well as the possibility that the defendant was
concealing a weapon or contraband.
5.

The State has met its burden by showing the defendant

voluntarily and specifically consented to Deputy Broadhead's
search of the front right area of his vehicle when (1) in
response to the inquiry about weapons and contraband he said
"You're free to look if you want." and (2) in response to a
request to search he said "Go right ahead."

Grovier § 136. The

law does not require a suspect to be informed of his or her right
to refuse or that the consent be written.

State v. Contrel, 886

P.2d 107, 111 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), State V. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4,
8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
6.

The legality of the traffic stop coupled with the absence of

any illegal conduct by the deputy, and the defendant's voluntary
consent supports denial of the defendant's Motion to Suppress.
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992).
Moreover, in State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) the Utah Court of Appeals said: " If, while conducting a
legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the
officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons,
he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances. "
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DECISION
Based on the above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Lav,
this court finds that Deputy Broadhead's search of the
defendant's vehicle was reasonable and limited, and conducted
with the defendant's specific voluntary consent. The defendant's
Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.

Dated this

/3

day of March, 199
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the
following, this

/&

day of March, 1996.

Robin K. Youngbeirg, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
E. Neal Gunnarson, Esq.
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Michael J. Christensen, Esq.
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

000046

